MLA'd and all...
Sparky the Dog
Professor MORONSKI
21 April 2014
Research Paper
A Street Car in Cincinnati, Would You
Want to Ride?
There has been an
ongoing struggle within the Cincinnati Political Sphere between people who
want, and those who do not. I am speaking of the proposed Street Car in
Cincinnati Ohio. The idea has been floating around since the mid 1990’s, and
has yet to come to fruition after many years spent researching the project and
its proposed lines, costs, “best routes” and whether this project should take
precedence over a high speed line serving the big three cities in Ohio of
Cincinnati, Columbus and Cleveland. The Street Car can be a bad idea for
Cincinnati if we take into consideration historical transit lines of
Cincinnati, gentrification, costs of construction in our already taxed market,
past area construction boondoggles, the instability of the Cincinnati business
district, the stability of the line, ridership populace in the area and whether
crime can be kept off the line.
Cincinnati Street
Cars have been in Cincinnati Ohio since the 1850’s when the first lines of
Horse drawn rail carts were created in the downtown area to first move supplies
back and forth between businesses (O’Neill). Within two years of the lines
opening to businesses, citizen passengers started riding the cars for small
fees. This was mostly due to groups of workers moving production materials
along city streets at first who basically hitched a ride to the next job (O’Neill).
Shortly after, rail cars specifically for passengers opened up for use
downtown. They would take people across what is now 4th street and up Vine
toward the Clifton area so people didn’t have to walk the hill or get on
horseback to go. By 1872, 4 incline cars were built in Cincinnati to service
various suburban areas at the time. The concrete bases can still be seen around
town in certain areas (“Cincinnati Trolley Coaches”). By 1883, Horse drawn
carts downtown for passenger service were on the way out, and a trolley system
was in place. The first Electric Trolley Cars went into service in 1889 (“Cincinnati
Trolley Coaches”). Within a few years, all remaining trolley, cable and horse
carts were replaced by overhead electric transit lines. These Street Cars at
their peak in the 1940’s eventually had over 200 miles of tracks in Downtown
Cincinnati (Cincinnati 010).
No single Street, Electric or Trolley car line has ever made it in Cincinnati
longer than 50 years. By the 1970’s, the Union Terminal Car Lines station was
being demolished ("What Is The Cincinnati Streetcar?"). The Metro Bus
line has the longest mass transit ridership in the city since 1953, and is
still in existence today.
Proponents of the
modern Street Car project in Cincinnati believe there will be a sustainable
ridership, and a base of users who can pay for upkeep of the line by way of
riding fees. The data doesn’t support this stance. Cincinnati was a city
starting in the late 18th Century when in 1788 when Mathias Denman,
Colonel Robert Patterson and Israel Ludlow named the area Losantiville from 3
different languages (“Cincinnati Trolley Coaches”). City population grew from
then until the middle 20th Century when urban Cincinnati dwellers
began to abandon the inner city in lieu of surrounding suburbs and job centers
(Cole. p. 977). During the time between and through to the 1950’s the city
population shifted many times from immigrants, to “country transplants”, to
eventually African Americans from the South looking to gain an industrial job
and make a home for their families. Cincinnati’s population peaked in the
1950’s at 503,998 according to Census data (atlasproject. p 36). Since the 1950’s we have lost 209,000 urban
residents, but the surrounding Greater Cincinnati Metro area has doubled in
size (Cole. p. 977). As business came to be in places such as Blue Ash,
Sharonville, Norwood, Carthage, St. Bernard and Evendale among others the
population followed suit and expanded into these areas more and more. In the
1970’s, Cincinnati saw the largest decline of population in a single decade,
followed closely by the 2000 census data (“Cincinnati Trolley Coaches”). Just
in the last ten years Cincinnati lost an additional 10% of its urban population
(“Cincinnati Trolley Coaches”). Sprawl, economic factors such as job market and
loss of the manufacturing base in the area have led many people to leave the
area in total. It would appear the ridership for the Street Car line abandoned
the city long ago and are not looking to come back anytime soon. This creates a
void for proponents to fill in some way, and the claims seem to be businesses
will spring up and people will move back to town for a Street Car line. There
has not yet been any evidence produced to show any intent amongst those in the
outlying areas to start moving back or looking for work in proposed line’s area
(Hahn).
However, the line
is to be built through one of Cincinnati’s most historically unfriendly
districts to businesses and citizens alike, the Over the Rhine district of the West
End and part of Clifton. Recent Gentrification of the area by making such bold
moves as doing away with the Laurel Homes Projects that were a mainstay in
Cincinnati for over 30 years has not helped the area (Cole. p. 977). It created
housing for more upwardly mobile and affluent younger people to live who may
work downtown, but with the lacking base of sustainable companies who pay
middle class wages it seems to have been a mistake when talking a base from
which to draw a significant ridership for a new Street Car line. Crime since
the removal of that public housing block has risen in outlying areas by roughly
the same number as it has dropped downtown (Cole. p. 977). Areas like Mt.
Washington, Norwood, and Oakley have seen their crime rates rise as the
displaced residents of the West End neighborhood move to outlying areas.
The gentrification
has beautified part of Cincinnati, but it has not given rise to the need for
additional transit made to serve only that specific population (Newbauer). People
who before moved to outlying areas to get a little less crime have found
themselves stuck in that same mix and moving further East or West of the city
to get away from the displaced population from the Laurel Holmes district that
was. Now there is a smaller rider base of city citizenry than in any time since
Cincinnati had Electric Rail in the early 1900’s. The proposed line rides
through a significant area that has been “reinvented” by city planners, but the
area mostly caters to small breweries, eateries, and legal offices. It also
serves several “mom and pop” type shops for the locals who are not fortunate
enough to have a middle class income and yet may need a cigarette, beer or check
cashed (Newbauer). Again, not a sustainable rider base from which to draw
taxable or fee driven Street Cars. I would invite anyone to take a drive along
the planned route and its expansion, and report what you see. Do you as a
citizen see the population that would be served by having a brand new Street
Car line in the city? It is a historic route to say the least, but the cars are
not being sold to the public as a “history ride through town”, but as viable
mass transit that will put Cincinnati back on par with other upwardly mobile or
cutting edge towns (Klepal). The two narratives are as follows. Supporters’ narrative: “The streetcar
alignment will foster economic development, increase commercial and retail
activities, and lead to redevelopment of the downtown housing stock. It will
have an impact on the city redevelopment as a whole, but in particular on the
neighborhoods along the streetcar’s proposed alignment.” (Makadi, Elad p.
136-146)
Opponents’ narrative: “The streetcar will be
underutilized and inefficient. As a result, it might attract a few businesses
and residents from other neighborhoods into the route’s surrounding streets,
but will not generate any significant change in the city’s land use pattern or
commercial and residential development.” (Makadi, Elad p. 136-146)
For study purposes, three scenarios
have been painted for the outcome. One with street Cars, one with limited
Street Cars and one with no Street Cars. Surveys of both retailers and
businesses see no significant planning on their part to open business on the
line, and or within close proximity to the line, “Under Scenario 1
(corresponding to the supporters’ narrative), three street-network-based strips
(service areas) were created around the proposed streetcar stops. As can be
seen in Fig. 3, the corresponding walking distances are 370 m, 730 m, and 1100
m (respectively 5, 10, and 15 min). Each strip was assigned a relative suitability
score where the 370 m strip was considered the most suitable for development.
In accordance with the streetcar supporters’ narrative, we assume that the
streetcar has no effect on land use change beyond 1100 m from the route (Makadi, Elad p.
136-146).
Under Scenario 2 (corresponding to
the opponents’ narrative), the maximum impact takes place within a half of city
block (60 m) from the proposed stops and extends up to 1.5 city blocks (180 m) (Makadi,
Elad, et al.
p. 136-146). In Scenario
3 this factor does not play any role since it is a no-streetcar scenario. Population
density factor. Population density is known to affect land use patterns. For
instance, commercial development occurs in proximity to densely populated areas
while industrial zones are steered away from residential development (Barredo,
et al). For modeling purposes, we assume that new residential and commercial
development occurs in areas with the highest population density, while
industrial land use is likely to be located in areas of lowest population
density. The assignment of suitability scores followed this assumption; employment
density factor. High employment density zones attract commercial and
residential developments. The average employment density in the study area is
96 employees per hectare. The areas carrying values higher than the average
were identified as high employment density zones. They were assigned higher
suitability scores for commercial and residential land use. For areas outside
these zones, a monotonically decreasing function was applied reflecting
distance decay, so that the closer a cell to the high employment density zone
the higher its suitability level for transitioning to commercial land use (Makadi,
Elad et. al p.
136-146). However, no study data has been generated on “intent” of business to
relocate to an already congested area of town in lieu of tax breaks and almost
free land to develop on the outskirts of the city. Basically, along the
proposed line there is no “land” to develop that doesn’t have existing housing
or businesses on it already and to develop that land as the prime real-estate
it is would cost tax payers additionally. As part of my investigation I took a
ride in my car twice over the proposed route looking for available land for
development. As a person who worked on the coordination and completion of both
the Great American Ballpark and the Paul Brown Stadium, I understand land
placement and build strategy. I see no place to develop businesses that would
increase sustainable ridership for the cars.
A
large concern among the electorate would be Cincinnati’s prior boondoggles in
the County and City construction arena and how to keep cost overruns, nepotism
and additional expenditures and taxes under wraps (NY times). Ken Belson of the New York Times focuses on
the example of Cincinnati, where voters approved a sales tax increase to fund
building a stadium for the Bengals and the Reds. With sales tax revenue
plummeting, the city is left holding the bag for the sports centers. Belson
writes,
"The teams
have not volunteered to rewrite their leases. So in the coming weeks, the
county plans to cut basic services, lower its legal bills and drain a bond
reserve fund with no plan for paying it back. 'Anyone looking at this
objectively knows it's a train wreck,' said Dusty Rhodes, the county auditor.
'I told them they were making a big mistake, but they didn't want to hear me.'”
Cincinnati has
historically had cost overruns at construction, I was part of the design and
building of both stadiums downtown, and as a worker in the industry, it made me
sad to see what we as a company were charging the County for things that should
have been discussed and not charged. The sales tax that was supposed to expire
once the Stadiums were built has yet to expire, and the whole idea was sold to
the population as a way to increase the Banks business district, and redevelop
the downtown area, and these projects still lag sadly behind dates thought to
be completed (NY Times). However, the County Commissioner of the time, Bob
Bedinghaus is now a highly paid employee of the Cincinnati Bengals organization
and no one can figure out what he does for them. Most believe his job is due to
sweetheart deals for the stadiums he procured for the Bengals. (Newbauer).
Cincinnati as a whole has tried multiple times in its recent history to “throw
money at the problem” of keeping businesses downtown by building new retail
space, renovating retail spaces once used by others, Shillito’s to Macy’s to
whatever else we can get in there. We have renovated Fountain Square, and most
of the West End district (Newbauer). As an almost lifelong resident of the city
I can tell you that people who do not live in the city have no desire to go to
the city. They have all the shopping and things they need in their own areas
and perceived crime and trouble in the city keeps most people from venturing
down. See Eastgate as a prime example. Between Eastgate and Anderson Township
mall a person can get just about anything of need. I am fairly sure it is
obvious our city has been set up in this manner, allowing suburban residents to
detach from the downtown experience.
In
summation, Cincinnati has tried Street Cars in many forms over the course of
the city’s existence (“Cincinnati Trolley Coaches”). From horse drawn rail
lines, inclines built into the seven hills, trolley cars to serve the inner
city population all the way to rail electrics through the 1950’s. (Cincinnati 010) None have
been sustainable for more than a 50-year run (Hahn). The area the newest
proposal implies would be the best route can be seen by mapping images done on
my peer reviewed papers provided that none of the proposed lines will serve
existing points of business, or any place where large scale business can be built
or installed in the community (Makadi, Elad et. al p. 136-146). This has made
the voting base leery of new construction that will only help one small part of
the city when the city can’t keep police, fire and or EMS services open. We
have issues with community centers and pools, but can find the money to build a
Street Car to serve a single and small section of inner city upwardly mobile.
This doesn’t fly in Cincinnati when the city population is in decline, and it
has become increasingly hard to get people from the surrounding areas to come
downtown to enjoy a day in the city, much less to ride a Street Car to nowhere.
Works Cited
O’Neill,
Tom. “Exhibit Commemorates the Streetcar Era; Fifty Years Later the Memories
Live On.” Enquirer.com. Cincinnati
Enquirer [Cincinnati, OH] 8 August 2001. Web. 23 March 2014.
atlasproject.
Historical Atlas of Cincinnati “The Relationship Between Transportation and
Urban Growth in Cincinnati.” Photographs. oldtimecincy.com pg. 36. 16 July
2010. Web. 23 March 2014.
Cincinnati
010. Map. Cincinnati, Ohio: C.O. Titus, 1869. Item #: US20629 Historic MapWorks
Residential Genealogy. historicmapworks.com. n.d. Web. 23 March 2014. Peer
Reviewed.
City
of Cincinnati. "What Is The Cincinnati Streetcar?" Cincinnati-oh.gov/streetcar/.
n.p. n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
The
Ohio Museum of Transportation Ohio’s Transit History. “Cincinnati Trolley
Coaches”. omot.org/history/cintc. n.p.
n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
Cole,
David. “Cincinnati Transit: A Brief History”. metro-cincinnati.org. pg. 977. n.d. Web. 30 March 2014
Newbauer,
Frank. “Stadium
‘fiasco’ not fault of Dems; blame all-GOP ex-county commissioners”.
Enquirer.com. Cincinnati Enquirer [Cincinnati, OH]. Letters
Editor. 5 December 2011. Web. 30 March 2014.
Klepal,
Dan. “Stadium mistakes not repeated, Reds more cooperative; county learned from
Bengals' debacle” Enquirer.com.
Cincinnati Enquirer [Cincinnati, OH] 18 March 2013. Web. 30 March 2014.
Belson,
Ken. “Stadium Boom Deepens Municipal Woes”. nytimes.com. The New York Times. [New
York, NY] 24 Dec 2009. Web. 30 March 2014.
Makadi, Elad, Diana Mitsova, Xinghau Wang. “Projecting
the impacts of a proposed streetcar system on the urban core land
redevelopment: The case of Cincinnati, Ohio”. Elsivier. Cities. Volume 35. P.
136-146. 11 July 2013. Web. 4 April 2014.
Peer Reviewed.
Hahn,
Barbara. "Union Terminal: Business Clubs, Railroads and City Planning in
Cincinnati." The Journal of Urban History 68.3 (2004) 30: 707. Sage Publications.
1 Jul 2004. Web. 4 April 2014. Peer Reviewed.
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